Abstract. Optical ID tags have been introduced and described to achieve remote target recognition and identification. Optical ID tags usually contain encrypted signatures to be read out, decrypted and verified. In this paper, new features are introduced so that ID 
Introduction
Optical identity (ID) tags have been shown as a useful tool to accomplish the generally difficult task of recognition and identification of moving objects [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . Using optical elements such as light emitters, passive ID tags and receivers, object tracking and also identity verification can be performed remotely and in real-time. The ID tag is commonly an optical code installed on a visible part of the object under surveillance. The optical code consists of either a direct image representative of the object (signature) or an encrypted function that scrambles the image and makes the signature unintelligible. A number of encryption strategies have been applied to a single signature [2, 4, 7] or a set of identifying factors [3, [5] [6] . The information distribution over
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the encryption techniques used in this paper to obtain an encrypted signature. It also introduces the procedure to synthesise an ID tag from the encrypted function. Section 3 focuses on retrieving the information included in the ID tag by means of a reading mask. The algorithms that make the ID tag resistant against deformations caused by perspective and optical distortions are presented in section 4, along with some of the most relevant verification results. Section 5 introduces the possibility of reduce the range of grey levels used to codify the ID tag information, evaluates its effects on the decryption process and provides verification results for deformed ID tags that display the complex-amplitude information with just 1 or 2-bits. Finally, the main points of this research work are summarized in the Conclusions.
ID tag synthesis
Two consecutive steps are involved to synthesise an ID tag. First of all, an encryption technique is firstly applied to the primary image used as a signature. This ciphering step can be accomplished by using a number of methods [6, [9] [10] [11] and gives a noise-like appearance to the encrypted signature that prevents its recognition from direct visual inspection. The encrypted information is distributed over the ID tag area in a second step. Former designs of the ID tag [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] allowed us to read out the ciphered information and to decrypt it even if the captured tag was scaled or rotated. A novel ID tag design is presented in this paper. It will permit to retrieve the information not only from scaled and rotated versions but also from extremely deformed captured ID tags. In this section, both steps, the encryption and the novel ID tag distribution, are described in detail.
Encryption
Optical encryption systems have been reviewed in the literature [5, 6] . For a single input, a number of encryption techniques are based on the double random phase encryption (DRPE), a method introduced in the pioneering work of Refregier and Javidi [8] . Recently, the linearity of this proposal has been proved to be the reason of some vulnerable aspects to intruder attacks [12, 6] . This vulnerability appears when it is assumed an ideal mathematical version of the DRPE technique and all the process is carried out in digital form. However, in a real optical implementation, the physical complexity of the system contributes with additional challenges to the opponent. Some variants of the DRPE technique have been recommended to increase the security and robustness of the encryption system. Among them, Towghi et al. [10] modified the linear encoding technique of the DRPE by introducing a nonlinear encoding. This proposal, named the fully-phase encryption (FPE), is used in this work. Let us recall it briefly.
Let the real valued function f x, y ( ) be the signature to be encrypted that is normalised
) and sampled to have a total amount of pixels N (Fig. 1a) . 
where symbol ( ) * represents convolution.
The encryption procedure converts the primary image into a stationary white noise that does not reveal the appearance of the input signature (Fig. 1b) .
The performance of the FPE method [10] will be compared to the DRPE technique [9] when both encryption procedures are applied at some point of this paper. The latter differs from the first in the function used as the input of the encryption method. While the FPE uses a phase encoded version of the signature ( )
 , the DRPE uses just the primary image
Information distribution on the ID tag
The synthesis of the ID tag is achieved by both multiplexing the information of the encrypted function ψ x, y ( ) and taking advantage of the ID tag topology [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . Let us consider the complex-valued encrypted function ψ x, y
where t = 1, 2,...N . We build two real valued vectors that are to be encoded greyscale: the magnitude vector ψ t ( ) and the phase vector φ ψ t ( ) (Fig. 1b) . It is preferable to print the phase content of ψ x, y ( ) in greyscale variations rather than in phase to avoid sabotage by, for instance, sticking an adhesive transparent tape on the tag. The information included in the ID tag is distributed in two optical disks. One disk corresponds to the magnitude ψ t ( ) , and the other contains the phase vector φ ψ t ( ). In both disks the information is distributed in a similar way, so that the information of a given pixel ( ) t corresponds to an angular sector in the optical code (Fig. 1c) . Thus, the readout of the ciphered information will be tolerant to variations in scale up to a certain range. For encrypted functions with a large number of pixels, as the example of Fig. 1 (30x30 pixels size), information needs to be distributed by using different concentric rings to ensure enough readable pixels in each sector (Fig. 1c) . Consequently, the tolerance to scale variations will be reduced in accordance to the number of concentric rings used in the ID tag. As we go far away from the centre, the radius of the concentric rings increases always by the same amount, ∆R , while the width of the angular sectors, ω i , decreases from a given ring to the next one in order to keep the number of pixels constant (Fig.   1c ). Values of parameters ∆R and ω i have to be fixed according to a particular application and its tolerance requirements. As shown in the example of Fig. 1c , the central circular area of radius R of both, the amplitude and phase disks, is not further divided into angular sectors.
Using the procedure described, the information is redundantly written, so that a natural resistance to noise and other damages due to common handling (e.g. scratches) would be likely obtained.
Regarding tolerance to scale variations, the topology of both disks is designed in this paper differently to previous proposals. In the past, only a half of the circles was used for such a purpose [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . The other semicircles were used to obtain rotation-invariance by writing both vectors, ψ t ( ) and ϕ ψ t ( ), in the radial direction and repeating them angularly [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . The rotation-invariant region of the ID tag was responsible for having a bigger size than the original size of the signature. Thus, for instance, in the case of the signature of Fig. 1a (30x30 pixel size)
an enormous tag of 1830x3660 pixels was generated. To optimize the dimensions of the ID tag, our proposal in this paper does not include these rotation-invariant semicircles. We introduce a set of reference white circular dots instead. As it will be justified in section 3.1, the minimum number of reference dots is determined by the kind of transformation used to compensate for the deformation of the captured ID tag. All the 15 reference dots of the template have a uniform value which is set to the maximum grey level (white) to make their detection easy.
The final ID tag synthesised from the encrypted signature of Fig. 1b is depicted in Fig. 2b . For this case of a 30x30 pixels signature, the synthesised ID tag has 470x930 pixels, which corresponds to a 7% of the total area of the original ID tag. The generated ID tag is located on an accessible part of the object under surveillance, so that a receiver can capture it from a remote distance. If necessary, the ID tag could be generated by using proper materials that make the ID tag only visible under NIR illumination [3] . In such a case, a detector sensible to the NIR spectrum needs to be used to read the information of the ID tag.
Information readout and verification
Once the receiver captures de ID tag, the object authentication implies the readout of the information included in the ID tag, its decryption and its verification. In the capturing process, degradation due to rotations, scale variations, shearing, perspective, distortion of the optical imaging system and so on can severely modify the geometry of the ID tag. To satisfactorily retrieve the information, it is important to ensure that the magnitude and phase values of the encrypted function ( )
are correctly readout without additional alterations. Thus, it is advisable to avoid digital transformation of the captured ID tag to compensate for deformations because digital interpolations would be involved in the process.
In this section, we firstly detail how a transformation matrix T , which accounts for the deformations of the captured ID tag, can be determined. Afterwards, we describe the procedure to retrieve the information from the tag without additional interpolations, and finally the decryption and verification processes are explained.
It is assumed that the receiver has a complete knowledge of the tag topology and the geometry with which the information is distributed in it.
Determination of the transformation matrix T
To calculate the transformation matrix T to compensate for possible degradations of the captured ID tag, we use the information concerning the fifteen reference dots distributed over the rectangular optical tag (Fig. 2 ). All the dots of the template are set to the maximum grey level (white). We apply a threshold level of 85% of the maximum grey level of the captured ID tag that permit to roughly detect the template. A digital image processing is carried out to distinguish between the sought reference dots and the unwanted elements that still remain in the binary image. The binary objects are digitally filled to obtain solid areas and an erosion operation with a circular structural element is applied to remove thin objects. Only the objects that remain in the eroded image are considered and they are reconstructed as they were before erosion. An additional threshold level regarding the object size is applied to eliminate small objects. Due to deformations in the capturing process, both reference dots and circular sectors appear with modified shapes. Usually, dots are transformed into ellipses. Thus, the final criterion to select the binary objects that belongs to the template is the comparison of the area of the object (number of pixels in the image) with the area of a hypothetical ellipse that has the same length of the major and minor axes of the object.
Once the template is detected, it is necessary to identify the reference dots in order to determine their correspondence with each dot of the original ID tag. The non-uniform distribution of the dots (see Fig. 2 ) permits to achieve this purpose. Groups a, b and c ( The identification of the fifteen reference dots on the captured ID tag is a necessary step to determine the degradation suffered by the tag, and, therefore, to calculate the transformation matrix T that links the original and the captured ID tag. According to Ref. [13] , the transformation introduced by a camera can be modelled by a polynomial function. In order to cover a wide range of deformations due to perspective and distortion of the optical imaging system, and from our preliminary studies, third order polynomials achieve a good approximation between the original and the deformed patterns in the vast majority of cases.
Thus, we choose this approximation to obtain a bijective transformation.
For a third order polynomial approximation, the transformation is defined by a matrix T that
where ( ) 
and superindex t indicates the transpose of the matrix. Theoretically, a minimum of ten reference points ( 9 q = ) are necessary to solve Eq. (2) and know the coefficients of the transformation matrix T . As aforementioned, we have added a template of fifteen reference dots on the ID tag to assure that the minimum number of reference points would be covered even if the deformation of the tag was severe or if some dots were cut.
The central coordinates of the dots of the template (usually, fifteen of them) detected and identified as described above, will be used to determine the transformation matrix T . Once this matrix is known, the bijective function described in Eq. (2) can be applied to transform a given image from one space to another [14] .
Reading mask and information readout
Once the deformation of the captured ID tag has been determined, the following step is to read the information contained in the tag according to its acquired geometry. To avoid additional alteration of the information of the tag, we do not transform the captured ID tag back to its original geometry because this process will imply interpolation of the pixel values. We propose instead to synthesise a reading mask that will adapt its shape to the distorted ID tag. Figure 3a shows an example of this reading mask. It shows a structure similar to the ID tag of (Fig. 2b) . It contains two disks divided into concentric rings and each concentric ring is subdivided in turn into small circular sectors.
The bijective transformation of Eq. (2) is applied to the reading mask so that it adapts its geometry to the captured ID tag (Fig. 3c and 3d) . Therefore, direct readout of the magnitude and phase values can be achieved. The fact that the circular sectors of the reading mask are smaller than the ones on the ID tag is intended to increase the reliability of the reading process 
Signature decryption and verification
Retrieved vectors ( ) As opposed to the DRPE [8] , two keys are needed to retrieve the signature when the FPE technique is applied. In that sense, the system security is increased. For the DRPE [8] , only the first phase mask, Authentication of the obtained signature will be positive if a comparison with a previously stored reference signature satisfies a given degree of similarity. The measurement of similarity between two images can be achieved by different procedures, among them, correlation [15] or the root-mean-square error (RMS) [14] . The latter has been chosen in this work to evaluate the system performance. The RMS is defined for an x M N image as ( ) ( ) 
Signature retrieval from severely deformed ID tags
In this section, we show simulation results that prove the reliability of the proposed ID tag. We test the new ID tag design under a variety of situations corresponding to the expected deformations that could be introduced in the capturing process by a remote receiver. To summarize the experiences we have analyzed, we only show some of the most interesting results, to show the limits of the system and at the same time, to present results when the ID tag has suffered strong degradation, even stronger than what one can expect from a common capturing system.
ID tag modified by perspective
In a general situation, the relative position of the receiver and the object under surveillance determines the perspective of the captured ID tag. Figure 3b depicts the angles considered to model the deformation introduced by perspective for a flat object, such as the ID tag [13] . 
Distorted ID tag by the optical imaging system
The optical imaging system of a camera may introduce distortion for wide field of view if it is not well-corrected. We simulate this optical aberration in order to consider a more realistic approach to the remote capturing of the ID tag. In case of distortion, both barrel and pincushion aberrations can be modelled by [16] 
where 0 a < corresponds to barrel distortion and 0 a > to pincushion, and ρ defines distance in polar coordinates (see figure 3b ).
By using equation (4), we have simulated an ID tag affected by both types of distortion. Again, this result clearly points out the advantages of using a reading mask to readout the information included in the tag, instead of digital interpolations of the captured ID tag.
ID tags reproduced with a limited number of grey levels
For practical purposes, a reduction in the number of grey levels used to codify the encrypted information on the ID tag would permit a more versatile optical tag in two senses. On the one hand, the devices used to reproduce the ID tags would produce more reliable optical tags since the number of grey levels that are actually reproduced in practice is usually lower than the number stated by the manufacturer and would not probably reach 256 grey levels as it has been assumed so far. On the other hand, the ID tag remote readout would be done in more relaxed conditions provided the number of grey levels was reduced. Ideally, a binary ID tag would be easily detected in a general situation and particularly under the presence of noise. Taking into account this consideration, we have carried out a study to evaluate the number of grey levels needed to reproduce the magnitude and phase codes of the ID tag without affecting the identification system performance. The range of grey levels, which depends on the number of bits used to codify the information, will have a direct repercussion on the applied encryption method. To evaluate this effect, the performance of two encryption methods, the DRPE [8] and the FPE [9] , has been compared. The analysis of the decryption results has been carried out when the number of bits used to reproduce the magnitude and the phase of the encrypted information is reduced from 8-bit to 1-bit (binary) functions. The retrieved signature and the original primary image have been compared in terms of the RMS (Eq. 3) for both encryption algorithms.
Let us consider the following situation: a binary amplitude distribution (left optical disk in the example of figure 6a ) and a number of grey levels for the phase information (right optical disk with 8 different grey levels in figure 6a ). In the ID tag reading process, the receiver assigns the grey level values of the phase code to the same number of discrete phase values ranging from [-π,π]. In the same way, the system assigns the binary values of the amplitude code to two quantized amplitude values. Let us firstly consider that these two quantized amplitude values are {0,1}. If the system performs so, the complex-amplitude encrypted function will have drastically discarded the amount of available information provided by the phase code, since half of the pixels of the amplitude information have a null value on average. As a result, the decrypted signal when the FPE is applied is noisy and hardly depicts the sought signature (see figure 6b ).
However, if the binary values of the amplitude code of the ID tag are assigned to two different quantized non-zero values, for instance {1,2}, the retrieved image will much resemble the original signature (see Fig. 6c ) and a positive verification would be achieved.
This example points out the need of determining the best amplitude value assignation for the grey levels used to represent the amplitude information on the ID tag, in a similar way as an assignation of phase values is carried out for the grey levels used to represent the phase code. Parameter k varies between zero and the maximum grey level chosen for the binary case. In our assignment the maximum grey level is established to 255, and thus, parameter k ranges from 0 up to 255. Figure 7a shows that the RMS value is significantly low if value k is chosen around a mid value of the discretization gap. That is, around 128 in the given example. Finally, figure 7c shows the results corresponding to a 3-bit representation of the amplitude code. The most remarkable result provided by this graph is that RMS variations are not noticeable for this number of grey levels. A similar conclusion can be stated for similar representations corresponding to larger amounts of bits. This result is in accordance with the fact that the number of pixels with a null value for a 3-bit amplitude representation has been reduced to 1 8 on average, and they have a small influence on the final decryption result. In figures 7a to 7c it can be seen that a binary phase code produces bad results in general. Four or eight grey levels for the phase code are much better. Finally, figure 9 provides some examples of severely deformed ID tags, which have a limited number of grey levels to reproduce both, the magnitude and the phase distribution of ( )
In the upper corner of the ID tags the satisfactorily retrieved signature is also shown. Figure 9a and 9b depict ID tags deformed by barrel and pincushion distortion, respectively. In both situations, the amplitude and phase information are both reproduced with 3-bits (or 8 grey levels). Figure 9c shows an example of ID tag modified by perspective for which only 2-bits (4 grey levels) are considered to reproduce both the amplitude and the phase distributions. Finally, Figure 9d presents an ID tag deformed simultaneously by perspective and distortion. In this example, the phase information is reproduced with 2-bits (4 grey levels) while the amplitude is binary. In all the cases shown in figure 9 , the retrieved signatures are clearly recognisable although the level of noise increases inversely proportional to the number of bits used to convey the information. We have shown that even for ID tags deformed by perspective and distortion simultaneously, it is possible to significantly reduce the number of grey levels used to reproduce the complex information of the encrypted signature without affecting the final verification result.
Conclusions
A novel proposal of experimentally feasible ID tags has been presented in this work. The new features introduced in the ID tag design increase its distortion-tolerance over a number of possible deformations that usually occur in remote detection. Not only are scale variations and in-plane rotations compensated for in the information reading and verification processes, but also extreme modifications due to perspective or distortion of the optical imaging receiver.
A significant reduction of the ID tag area is achieved along with an important reduction of the number of bits used to display the grey levels of the complex-amplitude encrypted information on the ID tag. Both characteristics will permit to manufacture more reliable ID tags and reduce its production cost.
Concerning the ID tag area, the use of a template of 15 reference dots has permitted to drastically reduce the size of the optical disks of the ID tag. For the example considered in this work (signature shown in figure 1a ) the area occupied by the new proposed ID tag (Fig. 2b) corresponds to approximately a 7% of the area occupied by previous designs of the tag reported in Refs [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] .
Regarding the range of grey levels, simulation results confirm that it is preferable to preserve the phase information of the encrypted signature included in the ID tag, than the amplitude distribution. For this reason, reduction in the number of grey levels (or bits) used to reproduce the phase information is more critical than the reduction of the number of grey levels used for the amplitude. In the latter case, it is possible to consider binary codes to implement the amplitude information on the ID tag, and still obtain positive verification results.
For two different encryption methods, the fully-phase encryption (FPE) technique shows better decryption and verification results than the double random phase encryption (DRPE) when limiting the number of bits to display the grey levels corresponding to the amplitude and phase distributions on the ID tag. In addition to this, the nonlinear input used for encryption in the FPE technique entails an increased robustness in front of certain intruder attacks in comparison to the DRPE. These results make the FPE technique more attractive to be combined with our
proposal.
Analysis and results provided in this paper show the satisfactory performance of the proposed ID tags. The new morphology of the tag permits verification of the information even for extremely degraded captured ID tags due to perspective or optical distortion even when the amplitude and the phase disks are both reproduced with only 2 bits, or when a binary (1-bit) amplitude is considered. 
